Football likes to describe itself as the ultimate meritocracy — a game where talent is visible, measurable, and impossible to hide. Goals are scored or they aren't. Matches are won or lost. And yet, according to Delroy Corinaldi, founder of the Black Footballers' Partnership (BFP), this is precisely where football's governance breaks down most visibly: the data shows merit being earned and recognised, but the wider system still failing to reward it.
The numbers football hasn't reckoned with
Corinaldi's starting point is not opinion but evidence. Black and mixed-heritage players make up around 43% of the men's professional game in England, yet hold only around 4% of coaching and management positions once their playing careers end. The BFP's analysis of 3,500 former players over 20 years adds a sharper data point still: when Black coaches do get a job, they perform as well as — or better than — their peers, yet are 41% more likely to be dismissed at equivalent performance levels. Corinaldi calls this football's “grass ceiling.”
He is careful, and insistent, that this is not an argument for lowering standards or trading merit for representation. If anything, it is the opposite: “the biggest mistake we would ever make in football is to start saying achievement and merit doesn't matter.” His case is that merit is already being demonstrated, repeatedly and measurably, and still isn't converting into opportunity. That gap — between demonstrated performance and who actually gets hired, retained, and promoted — is what Corinaldi frames as a governance failure rather than a diversity one: a failure of who gets to be in the room, who influences a decision, and what evidence is actually drawn on when decisions are made.
“In the room, but not the room”
Corinaldi's sharpest illustration doesn't come from the lower leagues at all — it comes from the very top of the game. He points to the FA Chair's position on FIFA's council during the recent controversy over the proposed World Cup private investment structure which was reported on during the World Cup earlier this year and the FA statement which made clear that “we were completely unaware of this proposal …”. For Corinaldi, this is instructive precisely because of who it happened to: the FA Chair, a member of the FIFA Council who was, in his words, “in a room, but not the room.” Corinaldi observed that if the FA Chair given their level of institutional access could be shut out of a material decision in this way, the position of a Black former player or coach trying to get a foot in the door of an executive team is, in his view, self-evidently harder still.
This is also his concern about the Independent Football Regulator itself. He is blunt that the absence of any Black representation on the IFR's board is “a massive own goal” and, in his view, “quite naive” — not because representation is a box-ticking requirement, but because a body charged with holding the game to account on inclusion and fairness has, in its own construction, repeated the exact pattern it exists to correct. It has also missed an opportunity to access the contribution of a clearly identifiable group which has been fundamental to the transformation of football.
Why this isn't an “EDI” conversation
One of Corinaldi's more pointed arguments is that framing this issue as an EDI initiative actively undersells it. Diversity and inclusion programmes, in his telling, can become “tokenistic,” HR-owned, and disconnected from business decision-making. The case for Black coaches and managers, by contrast, is a business case: the data shows that clubs fielding more Black players, and appointing more Black coaches and managers, perform better. He points to Mohamed Salah at Liverpool as a case in point — research has linked Salah's visibility and success to a measurable reduction in Islamophobic sentiment in the surrounding community, alongside the clear commercial value he generated for the club and the inspirational role he plays for fans and aspiring talent alike. For Corinaldi, this is the real argument: representation that reflects genuine merit doesn't just correct an injustice, it builds reputation, trust, community engagement and revenue — the same currencies every other governance theme in this series keeps returning to.
Where the other interviews agree — and where they complicate the picture
Corinaldi's argument doesn't stand in isolation. Alys Carlton, independent chair of the Football Association of Wales, makes a strikingly similar connection from her own experience: the FAW's move from a council she describes as once dominated by “white men of a certain age” toward a more representative board and council was, in her account, directly linked to greater trust from stakeholders — people could see that the organisation's decision-makers increasingly reflected the game they were representing.
Craig Beeson of the Sports Governance Academy offers a useful note of caution alongside this when warning against organisations targeting their way to diversity through focusing on one or two demographics, as composition needs will change over time and need to be responsive to circumstances, Beeson notes that across the wider sports sector, progress towards diversity has generally been stronger at non-executive board level than within senior executive teams — exactly the layer Corinaldi's data says is the actual blockage in football. The two perspectives point at the same gap from different ends: boards have diversified faster than the executive pipelines beneath them, which is one reason Corinaldi's 4%-of-jobs statistic persists even as boardroom composition slowly improves.
Matt Slater's reporting adds a final, complementary dimension. The boards he cites as governance success stories — Brentford, Bournemouth — are notable for drawing directors from well outside football's traditional recruitment pool, precisely the kind of diversity thinking Corinaldi argues football's old recruitment networks keep crowding out. The common insight across our interviews is the same: good governance recruits for what a decision-making table is missing, not for who already looks comfortable sitting at it.
The measure of progress
Asked what success would look like in three to five years, Corinaldi's answer is simple: a boardroom, a coaching team, a backroom staff where nobody feels the need to debate why a Black candidate is there, because the data and the results already answer the question. Until that moment, Corinaldi's argument is that the game isn't just falling short on fairness, but on its own evidence, it's falling short on governance — and leaving value on the table because of it.