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Welcome to the Football Good Governance Series. 

Over the course of this series, we sat down with four people who see English football's governance from entirely different vantage points: Alys Carlton, independent chair of the Football Association of Wales (“the FAW”); Matt Slater, lead sports correspondent at The Athletic; Craig Beeson, head of the Sports Governance Academy; and Delroy Corinaldi, founder of the Black Footballers' Partnership. The conversations took place against the backdrop of the Football Governance Act and the arrival of the Independent Football Regulator (“the IFR”) — the most significant structural change to how English football is overseen in the game's history.  We have called this The Good Governance Series. 

We didn't set out to find agreement. An FA chair, a journalist, a governance trainer and a campaigner for racial equity in coaching and management would, on paper, be expected to bring very different priorities to a conversation about governance. However, what struck us, across four separate and independently conducted interviews, was how often they arrived at the same conclusions from entirely different starting points — about what good governance actually is, why it matters, and what happens when it's absent. The pieces that follow in this series each take one of those shared conclusions and examine it in depth, drawing out what each interviewee said and where their perspectives reinforce, complicate, or sharpen one another. 

It feels right to open the series following on from the publication that has made the argument for all of us: the IFR's own State of the Game report. 

A report that needs no exaggeration 

The State of the Game report is the most forensic examination English football's finances have ever faced — and it does not make comfortable reading. Despite the game generating over £9bn in revenue last season, 94% of clubs across the top five divisions are loss-making. More than 60% of EFL and National League clubs are technically insolvent. Thirty-two clubs hold less than 30 days' cash cover. More than a quarter could not survive a month without owner funding being topped up. IFR chair David Kogan has warned that "skyrocketing revenues have been outpaced by costs which in turn have pushed up debt, loss-making and an over-reliance on owner funding” the report described the picture bluntly: a “dangerous cocktail of rising debt and over-reliance on owner funding,” building up while the game's commercial success masks the underlying fragility. 

None of this will come as a surprise to anyone who spoke to us for this series. In fact, almost every root cause the report identifies is one our interviewees had already diagnosed, from entirely different vantage points, before a word of the report was published. 

The report confirms what the interviews already showed 

Matt Slater's reporting on the Premier League and EFL's long-running failure to agree a new distribution deal maps precisely onto the report's central financial finding: a Premier League club now earns more than eight times the revenue of an average Championship club, parachute payments distort spending incentives throughout the Championship, and the two leagues have been unable to resolve this themselves — hence the IFR's warning that it retains a “back-stop” power to impose a settlement if football won't agree one. Slater's account of entrenched self-interest at the negotiating table — his anecdote, in particular, of a football club chair arguing three contradictory positions in a single week depending on whose interest was at stake — is the behavioural explanation for exactly the financial cliff-edge the report now quantifies. 

Craig Beeson's warning that governance architecture is “the easy bit” and that the harder task is building a genuine culture of good governance also accords with the findings of this report. The IFR's new licensing regime, with the related licensing application window opening at the beginning of November, will require clubs to hold more cash, build real contingency plans, and show how they manage financial risk — but as Beeson argues, rules on paper only work if the culture inside boardrooms actually uses them. A club can satisfy a minimum compliance threshold and still be one bad season away from insolvency if its board isn't genuinely engaging with the risk. 

Delroy Corinaldi's insistence that governance means “how decisions are made and in whose interest” is, in effect, the report's whole diagnosis in miniature. Clubs have been making short-term spending decisions in their own competitive interest — chasing promotion, avoiding relegation — without the structures in place to test whether those decisions serve the club's long-term survival, or the wider pyramid's stability. And his point about the IFR's own composition — that a body meant to hold the game to account should itself reflect the game it regulates — applies just as much to its credibility on financial oversight as it does to diversity: a regulator's authority rests on being seen to understand, and represent, the whole game it governs. 

Alys Carlton's experience in Wales offers a useful contrast rather than a parallel. The FAW, operating at a different scale and outside the IFR's remit, has shown that proportionate, self-directed governance reform — done early, and done by choice — can build the kind of financial and institutional resilience the report says much of the English professional game now lacks. It is a reminder that the alternative to imposed regulation was always self-regulation done well; English football's clubs, collectively, didn't take that path. 

The fix: unifying governance, not just imposing more of it 

The report's proposals for resolution of these challenges — more cash reserves, real contingency planning, fairer revenue distribution, cost controls, and transparency on how clubs account for fan and governance commitments — are necessary. But on the evidence of this series, these proposals will not be sufficient on their own. Rules change behaviour only when the culture around them does too, and English football's deeper problem, visible in every interview in this series, is fragmentation: a Premier League, an EFL, and a National League each governed with reference to their own competitive and commercial interest, a regulator with its own separate remit and credibility question, and 116 individual boards each making locally rational decisions that add up to a collectively unstable system. 

What the State of the Game report makes unavoidable is the case for unifying governance across the pyramid — not a single rulebook applied uniformly regardless of scale, which Craig Beeson's proportionality argument rightly warns against, but a shared set of decision-making standards, shared transparency, and a shared accountability to the long-term health of the whole game rather than any one tier's short-term position. The IFR's licensing regime and its backstop powers over distribution are the first real mechanism English football has had to force that alignment. Whether it works will depend on whether clubs, leagues, and the regulator itself treat this as what Alys Carlton would call genuine custodianship of the game — or simply another compliance exercise to be managed until the next crisis arrives. 

Where this series goes next 

The State of the Game report is the clearest possible illustration of what happens when governance is treated as an afterthought. The rest of The Good Governance Series looks at the other side of that coin — what good governance actually delivers, and what it will take to build it properly across every part of the game. Drawing on the full set of interviews, upcoming pieces in the series examine: 

  • The commercial and competitive case for good governance — why the best-governed clubs and federations are so often the best-performing ones too, not despite their governance but because of it. 

  • Merit, diversity and football's “grass ceiling” — why the data on Black coaches and managers points to a governance failure, not an HR problem, and what fixing it would actually look like. 

  • Proportionality — why a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation risks doing as much damage as having none at all. 

  • Trust and transparency — how federations, clubs and regulators earn (and lose) the confidence of the people they serve. 

  • Outside voices and independent challenge — a cultural perspective on the case for boardrooms that don't just recruit from football's own talent pool. 

  • Self-interest and the character test — a cultural perspective on why good governance depends on who's in the room, not just what the rulebook says. 

  • Invisible until it breaks — why governance only gets attention when something goes wrong, and what that costs. 

Taken together, the aim of this series is simple: to make the case, using the direct experience of people working inside football's governance landscape, that good governance isn't a constraint on the game we love. It's the foundation the game is currently missing. 

More from our football good governance series

Do reach out to Patrick Davis who leads on our football governance solutions to find out more, patrick.davis@lawdeb.com